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Asking someone in Hungary about the Treaty of Trianon would most probably yield an answer close 
to a lament. Something about injustice, intolerable loss, mourning, truncation and amputation, 
incredible suffering of ethnic kin beyond the borders set with the treaty. While most people would 
certainly use this tone, rooted in the immediate aftermath of the WWI when it was first used 
consciously, hardly any would believe if they were told that the same tropes, metaphors and 
emotions dominated debates in the Romanian parliament throughout the 1920s. Romania was, after 
all, the „winner of Trianon”, the triumphant neighbor, the nation that still today defiantly celebrate 
the anniversary of December 1, only to frustrate Hungarians. Maybe, also most Romanian would be 
astounded to learn that Romanian political parties in the 1920s sought scapegoats for an alleged 
national tragedy, warned about the catastrophe that befell a part of the nation, invoked truncation 
and injustice when they debated who were responsible for the loss of a third of the Banat. 
Such unexpectedly similar emotions, however surprising they are, serve only as a secondary motive 
for taking two symbolically important geographic areas, the Székelyland and the Banat, and compare 
how the diplomatic struggle for these regions around 1919-1920 related to the phenomenon of 
regionalism. The making of nation states in 1918-1920 was, after all, a series of decisions made over 
the affiliation of regions with states. These were sometimes simple geographic entities, or functional 
regions defined by economics and communication lines, but some of them had dense histories, 
symbolic significance for certain national projects, and the people in such regions often nurtured a 
sense of community within. However, the broad claims in the period mostly based on the idea of 
national self-determination, and the wide array of arguments used - ethnic, historic, economic, 
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strategic etc. – makes it handy to interpret struggles over such areas predominantly as part of a 
uniform national struggle, obscuring the specifics and peculiarities of each region. 
Both the Banat and the Székelyland are cases, in which people were mobilized within and outside the 
region, nd throughout this attempt emphasis was laid onsomething that could be called regional 
peculiarity. Both cases figured strongly in the debates over the new boundaries of Hungary and 
Romania. Therefore, I argue, they offer useful insights in the way the peace-making affected, even 
transformed regionalism, enhanced the potential of the Székely elite to push back against attempts 
of subordination from Budapest, and made interwar Banat regionalism more dependent on 
Bucharest, despite the permanent confrontation of self-claimed Banat regionalists with the Old 
Kingdom elites. 
I will start with outlining the basics of peacemaking, including the typical arguments of the 
contestants, followed by an analysis of the different forms of popular mobilization within and for the 
regions. Finally, I will connect the events of the tumultuous years with its afterlife, pointing out how 
the struggle affected the tenets of regionalism and how the debates were later used by different 
actors to pose competing claims on being the true representatives of the region. 
Red lines, white spots: peace-making and arguments for a new boundary 
The collapse of the dualist Monarchy was of breathtaking speed after the Bulgarian armistice was 
signed on 29 September 1918. While Franchet d’Espérey’s troops moved to the north, pushing back a 
gradually disorganizing Austro-Hungarian army,1 national councils was formed in capital cities of the 
Monarchy and its provinces. In Hungary, István Tisza admitted military defeat on 17 October 1918,  
and Alexandru Vaida-Voevod announced in the lower house of the Hungarian parliament that only 
the Romanian National Party represented Hungary’s Romanians and was entitled to decide over their 
fate., A Hungarian National Council was formed on 24 October 1918, and a Romanian one - on 30 
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October, both councils invoking the idea of national-self-determination. When the Monarchy 
concluded an armistice on 3 November, the state itself did not exist anymore and Romania’s second 
entry in the war on 10 November found no real resistance in the extinct Habsburg army. 
The slogan of the day was national self-determination, and national councils acted as the sole 
representatives of millions of people in Zagreb, Ljubljana, Prague, Martin, Budapest, Arad, competing 
for influence and power with workers’ and peasants’ councils too.2 While advancing armies pushed 
forward to acquire the territories their governments claimed, minorities also erected their national 
bodies: Jews in Cluj, Sighetul Marmatiei, and Timisoara, Saxons in Sibiu and Kronstadt, Germans in 
Timișoara and Budapest. At the end of the year, Serbian troops settled on a long demarcation line 
that left in their possession even more than the new South Slav kingdom saw as its rightful share, 
including the Banat, and the Romanian army reached the boundary of the historic province of 
Transylvania. The Ruling Council (Consiliul Dirigent) acted as the government of these territories, 
whose annexation to Romania was declared at Alba Iulia on 1 December. 
A curious moment of the process of imperial dissolution was when important dignitaries and 
politicians of the Hungarian state set up in Budapest a Székely National Council on 9 November. A 
few days later, this body was transformed into a broader representative institution, although its 
members, like Miklós Bánffy, István Bethlen or Dénes Sebess, were not necessarily of Székely origin. 
The Council adopted a plan to erect an independent Székely Republic, tied to Hungary in foreign 
policy and customs union, which was to be represented at the peace conference too. It also 
organized a mass demonstration in Târgu Mureș on 28 November, but the Romanian authorities 
soon arrested the key figure of the movement in Székelyland, Árpd Paál, deputy lord-lieutenant of 
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Udvarhely county.3 Nevertheless, the situation on the ground remained tenuous,4 and the Budapest-
based organizations conducted propaganda internationally to obstruct the annexation of the region 
to Romania. 
While opposition regarding the Székelyland with its predominantly Hungarian population (well over 
90 percent of the inhabitants of Csík, Udvarhely, Háromszék, and Maros-Torda counties) was easy to 
understand, the opposition  regarding the envisioned future of the Banat within Greater Romania 
was difficult to digest in Bucharest. The Entente promised the whole region to Bucharest according to 
the secret treaty of 1916, but in November 1918 the area was occupied by Serbian troops, and Serbia 
laid claim to the whole region too.  
When the peace conference opened,5 both regions of the Székelyland and the Banat counted as 
contested ones. However, despite the undeniable Hungarian character of the Székelyland, none of 
the decision-makers wanted to retain it with Hungary, its future being questioned only later, with the 
arrival of the Hungarian delegation in January 1920 in the French capital. The Hungarians made a 
series of proposals, essentially all rejected, but they still tried to make an argument over the future of 
the Székelyland outside Romania. The Banat, multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan, urban and much more 
developed than the Székely areas, was a more immediate flashpoint, and the issue was settled well 
before the Hungarian treaty was even drawn up. After months of diplomatic wrangling the 
conference drew a line and divided the region between the two rival states.6 The mostly agrarian 
western plains were annexed to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the fertile north, the 
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industrial south and mountainous east went to Romania. Thus, the entire Székelyland was 
incorporated into Romania, later becoming a so-called “cultural zone”, an area to 
(re)conquerthrough energetic Romanianizaton policies,7 while the whole Banat became a divided 
area and a symbol of Romanian failure at the peace conference. 
What were the most important arguments, presented by diplomats at the conference, and how they 
reflected the alleged uniqueness of the regions, how these regions were constructed in Paris? 
Regarding the Székelyland, its existence at the center of Romania’s national territory was an 
accident. Given that, even the plans least favorable to Romania has drawn the boundary hundreds of 
kilometers westward,8 its possession by Romania was never in doubt among Romanian politicians, 
and the Romanian delegation did not need an elaborated argumentation to justify its claim on this 
specific zone of the country. It was more the general arguments – spread of Romanians, strategic 
necessities, communication line – in favor of the unity of the country that simply implied that this 
geographic zone naturally belongs to Greater Romania too. When it came to mentioning the 
Székelys, the Romanians carefully distinguished them from Hungarians (although admitting that they 
are closely related with Hungarians). The memorandum, submitted on 8 February 1919, which 
presented statistical data on the ethnicity of Transylvania’s population, argued that, since the region 
had strong economic ties with surrounding Romanian areas, its inhabitants would prefer Romania 
over Hungary.9 While Romani easily prevailed in this regard, the Hungarian population, despite all its 
alleged favorable views on the new country,remained a thorn in the flash., The discomfort they 
caused for Bucharest was manifested the best in a provision of the Minority Treaty, originally 
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rejected by the Romanian government as unacceptable violation of sovereignty, that provided for 
educational autonomy of the Székely and Saxon communities.10 
as regards to the borders, Hungarians in Paris argued in the same vein and emphasized the natural 
economic, hydrological and cultural unity of the Carpathian Basin and Hungary, the defender of 
Europe a necessary cornerstone of European peace. No specific proposals regarding the Székely 
region were made.11 While somewhat surprising, not to focus on this manifest violation of the idea of 
national self-determination was certainly logical, as the Hungarian delegation seriously considered it 
realistic to achieve a plebiscite on the whole territory, thus it did not aim at preserving specific zones 
with more adjusted arguments.12 However, in a separate note (Nr. VIII.) of the peace delegation(, it 
raised the issue of Transylvania, but again, without singling out the Székelyland. Instead, they 
proposed a comprehensive reorganization of a semi-independent Transylvania (loosely part of a 
Hungarian state) into autonomous regions, which was basically Oszkár Jászi’s plan from late 1918.13 
The Székely “anomaly” was only scarcely mentioned,14 the Hungarian delegates putting more effort 
in convincing the peace conference to decide for the returning of the Hungarian inhabited strip along 
the new borders.  
The case of the Banat brought to the fore strikingly similar official argumentations, and the region – 
despite never having been a proper political entity contrary to the Principality of Transylvania –was 
listed separately among the provinces Romania claimed. (Transylvania, Banat, Crișana, Maramureș.) 
A separate section of the above-mentioned memorandum detailed the official argumentation, 
starting from the assumption that the “Banat is not a geographic name, rather reality, a proper 
geographic unit and a real province in political sense, which is an indivisible unity today just as it was 
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throughout the history.”15 Nevertheless, the Romanian arguments, presented by Ion. I. C. Brătianu, 
aimed primarily at forcing the Great Powers to acknowledge the still binding nature of the Bucharest 
treaty of 1916.16 It was his primary consideration and claim, all other points were of secondary 
importance. Still, Brătianu elaborated the uniquely unitary character of the Banat, mentioning the 
hundreds of years presence of a Romanian majority, the complementary nature of the Banat’s 
subregions in economic terms, the importance of the unified control over the waterways provided by 
the three rivers on its borders and the smaller ones (Timiș, Bega) within, and tried to alleviate the 
fear that Romanian presence ˗̶̶   almost opposite to Belgrade    would mean a serious strategic threat 
to the South Slav state.17 The ethnic composition of the region was mentioned too, first arguing that 
Romanians constitute the majority, and also populate the western areas, and second, with the rather 
astounding claim that, if the Hungarians and Germans would face a choice between the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) and Romania, they would opt for the latter.18 
His opponents, the South Slav and the Hungarian delegates, did not make strong and specific 
arguments regarding the Banat. The Serbian claims were justified by such arguments, as ethnicity, 
historic tradition of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the region,  economic benefits of having fertile 
plains to provide food and raw material for Belgrade, and later, after the South Slavs moderated their 
demands to about one third of the region, strategic considerations     a significant distance between 
the capital, Belgrade, and the border    were emphasized.19  
The Hungarians, similarly to the case of the Székelyland, made an argument about the unitary nature 
of the country, the Banat being one of its important and well developed parts. They also asserted – in 
a strange contradiction to Brătianu’s assertion they did not know about – the willingness of the Banat 
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Germans to side with Hungary and Hungarians in case of a plebiscite. Thus, they also questioned the 
ethnic arguments of the Romanians, pointing out that the Germans and the Hungarians formed 
together the majority in the region.20 
Masses and memoranda: mobilization within and without 
Whereas diplomatic arguments and documents on all sides refrained from using the peculiarity of 
the Banat and the Székelyland as a strong argument in favor of either one of the claims, both 
geographic zones were palpably regions with a sense of difference present among the people, 
although vastly different ones. The Székelyland was a distant, mountainous area, secluded from the 
center of Transylvania and not easily accessible, apart from its southern part close to Brasov. The 
Banat was a fertile plain in the west and the north and a mountain zone in the east and south, which 
held rich deposits of coal and iron    the preconditions of an industrial base. Thus, in the Székely areas 
mountain agriculture was the dominant economic sector, with light industry (glass making, lumber 
mills, stitching within households, tobacco) developing in the south, and the exploitation of natural 
reserves (mainly stone) all over the area. The largest city, Târgu Mureș was a developing industrial 
center, but the small countryside towns were often just marketplaces and centers of secondary 
education.21 By contrast, within the Banat there was a southeastern industrial zone with steelworks 
and mines, forestry and lumber making, which attracted a significant number of immigrant 
workforce. In the north and west agriculture was the basic activity, but the richness of the land soon 
helped the emergence of food processing industry in the form of large factories. Finally, the unofficial 
capital and the largest city of the Region, Timișoara was a real hub of commerce, industry and 
transportation. Its labor force was around 7000 persons, all working in large factories ranging from 
machinery production to chemical industries. The city had its own stock exchange and port on the 
Bega channel.  
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It is thus hardly surprising that the society of the two regions was also significantly different. 
However, the most important in this regard was probably not the higher number of industrial labour 
and the breadth of an educated, modern middle-class – many of the late immigrant to the region – in 
the Banat. What made the Székelys peculiar was a long past of feudal privileges that set them apart 
from the regular nobility of Hungary and Transylvania and was reimagined as a collective “feudal 
nation”.22 The privileges were was only abolished in 1848, with Székelys’ enthusiastic embrace of the 
Hungarian nation and nationalism, but it was still a vivid memory of that time.23 Furthermore, the 
erstwhile separate status was often legitimized by a history of separate descent and ethnic 
difference, the Székelys being descendants of the Huns, but still the best and most authentic 
Hungarians.24 At the turn of the 20th century this reasoning was semi-officially adopted, when large 
scale government-sponsored development projects started. One of the justification was the 
importance to salvage the Székelys, the best Hungarians, from being gradually dissolved into the sea 
of the Romanians, or being forced out of their backward homeland.25 
Such a strong and focused sense of historical peculiarity was absent with regard to the Banat. The 
area was reconquered from the Ottoman Empire in 1716, and until 1778    administered directly from 
Vienna as a laboratory of enlightened absolutist development policies, the Banat thus becoming the 
destination of successive waves of colonization.26 The new administration had overlaid almost 
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everything that had remained from the medieval Banat, nevertheless, a common regional identity 
was not fostered. Most intellectuals opted for the integration into either Hungarian or Romanian 
national movements, thus re-telling the history of the region as part of either Hungarian or Romanian 
history.27 The Romanian version emphasized the Dacian roots of the territory and the long existence 
of Romanians there. At one point, it also picked up the history of the military frontier with its single 
Romanian regiment with its headquarters in Caransebeș. Politically, the region became a battlefield 
between the pro-Hungarian Romanians, the Romanian national activist, the protagonists of the 
liberal Hungarian governing parties – often local large landowners – and their opposition, the latter 
being mainly composed of more recent immigrants, active in modern professions that flourished due 
to the richness of the region.28  
At the end of the war, the Banat and the Székelyland were scenes of customary revolutionary 
mobilization against the state administration and for the establishment of national councils. The 
mobilization, often bearing a violent character, occurred first in the larger cities, being later brought 
from there to the villages.29 The Banat was, however, the scene of a peculiar phenomenon. On 31 
October  1918, Otto Roth, a Social Democratic lawyer, announced the establishment of a People’s 
Council and “declared” the Republic of Banat.30 Roth, who henceforth wore the title of People’s 
Commissioner, referenced the peculiarity of the Banat by saying: “We showed the world, we showed 
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our later descendants, that the people of the Banat and of Temesvár could fight for the republic and 
a better future without [shedding] blood.”31 He portrayed the region as a multiethnic one, in which 
national differences were of secondary importance.  
But it was a rather curious conceptualization, as most people in the region had a more limited 
horizon than Roth, whose mental map was rooted in a multiethnic movement as organized labour 
was composed of people often moving from one place to another. Villagers and even inhabitants of 
smaller urban centers thought in different terms. When a few months later it came to the 
reconfiguration of administrative units (counties), local inhabitants revealed that their immediate 
environment was where they felt most at home. The proposal of the inhabitants of Belinț is a case in 
point.32 Around the end of the war the village was transferred from Timiș to the so-called Lugoj 
county (set up by the French occupation authorities in March 1919), a change that alleviated serious 
burden of the locals, but subsequently was to reversed by the Romanian administration. In a petition, 
it was argued that before the first administrative rearrangements they had to visit Timișoara with 
administrative matters, that was much further than Lugoj. In fact, the villagers had vivid connections 
in Lugoj and their economic activity was centered around the city, while Timișoara was only a distant 
administrative center.  
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the mobilization of masses in Banat (at least of those who were 
not active in the widespread violence), apart from Roth’s attempt – one that never really succeeded 
in unifying the national councils of the Banat –  occurred through Romanian, German, Serbian and 
Hungarian national councils. In the Székely region non-Hungarian councils were a rarity, in the Banat, 
however, it was the rule, and the Romanian bodies politely and diplomatically rejected any attempt 
to involve them with the Hungarian state administration, apart from co-operation for the 
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preservation of public order.33 But their time only struck after the withdrawal of Serbian troops, and 
after the French occupation authorities replaced the Hungarian administration of the so-called Lugoj 
county with a Romanian one, in June 1919.34 
The Székely National Council was established on 9 November 1918 outside the region, in Budapest. It 
was first the endeavour of a few, dubious figures, who wanted to use the initiative for restoring their 
position in politics. Conflicts with a more influential group of politicians eventually led to the 
secession of a group, while the main body remained under the control of the latter, and their 
experts, Miklós Bánffy, Dénes Sebes, István Bethlen, Gábor Ugron, Elemér Jancsó among others,35 
wished to use the idea of national self-determination to savage the eastern parts of Hungary. It did 
not remain, however, confined to Budapest; Székely National Councils were set up in many cities 
outside the region, even as far as Sightul Marmației.36 In this specific case, the initiator was from 
Miercurea Ciuc, the vice-president being active in other Székely societies that mushroomed all over 
Hungary after the so-called Székely Congress in 1902, where a large-scale development program for 
the region was initiated.37  
The Council’s activity was carried out mainly in Budapest. There were some demonstrations in the 
Székelyland  before the arrival of Romanian troops. The assembly in Gheorgheni was greeted by 
Gábor Ugron, former minister of interior and royal commissioner for the reconstruction of 
Transylvania. its declaration addressed to the public announced that the Székelys again must fulfil 
their millennial role of defending Hungary’s eastern borders. The politician called for a new Székely 
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people’s assembly where the leaders would give guidance.38 But when it came to organizing, on 28 
November, a mass demonstration against the advance of Romanian troops to Târgu Mureș, the local 
Hungarian National Council, which leaders, unlike the Székely National Council leaders, were from 
Oszkár Jászi’s Civic Radical party, protested for fear of violence and thus achieved a scaling down of 
the event. They were also suspicious of how Bethlen and his peers “abused” the term Székely which 
– as they insisted – raised the specter of detaching Székelys from Hungarians39  
The Székely National Council was also active in contesting the claims of the Romanian National 
Council and the Alba Iulia assembly on 1 December 1918. Mid-November they issued a declaration 
which contended the Romanian historical arguments, most notably the thesis of Romanian 
continuity. It also proclaimed that Transylvania was for four centuries the common homeland of 
Romanians, Hungarians, Saxons and Székelys, therefore,  any arrangement that would have violated 
Hungary’s territorial integrity was rejected.40 A reply to the Alba Iulia Declaration was drafted, the 
text being much more concrete in detailing Székely specificities, although its reasoning about the 
inviolability of Hungary’s territorial integrity as an economic, cultural and geographic  necessity was 
basically the same as in the previous document. A clear distinction between the Székelys and the 
Hungarians was made, postulating that the Székelys were for a thousand year detached from their 
mother country, although preserving their Hungarianness. The annexation of the whole province of 
Transylvania to Romania would lead to the extinction of the thousand years old Székely culture and 
its special development, even if the promise of autonomy would have been realized, was emphasized 
in the text. The Romanian territorial demands made the secession of Székelyföld from Hungary 
inescapable. Only an independent nation could avoid being incorporated into Romania; based on this 
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argument, the Székely National Council handed an ultimatum to the Hungarian government: if there 
was no chance to retain Transylvania, the Council was to proclaim an independent Székely Republic.41 
The plan for an independent Székely republic was elaborated by Árpád Paál, deputy lord-lieutenant 
of Odorheiu county and chairman of the local Székely National Council.42 Paál outlined a curious 
construct, betraying that its author was an adept of Jászi’s civic radicalism and progressivism, thus 
combininf his social ideas with the Hungarian national idea.43 Paál’s Székely Republic was imagined as 
a communitarian state with the dominance of public property and a state managed economy, private 
initiatives were to be reduced to the family sphere, and a youth labour service would have provided 
the workforce for state infrastructure projects. It is important to note that Paál based the legitimacy 
of a Székely republic both on historical and geopolitical arguments. The historical ones were the 
usual suspects: the unique Székely history, although Paál added that the Székelys, whose territory 
was a theater of operations since 1916, suffered more during the war than other Hungarians. In 
geopolitical terms, Paál drew an analogy with Switzerland, a country he understood as a necessary 
neutral zone at an important boundary between four major powers. He argued that the Székelyland 
had the same function in Eastern Europe, mitigating threats from the East, especially in the light of 
the dual threat, that of the Communism and the “yellow Asian race”. For him, the Székelys were 
especially adept to ward it off, due to their traditional communitarianism and Asian origins. 
The first phase of the activity of the Székely National Council ended with the proclamation of the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic. In early 1919, the Council still issued a few declarations, among which 
discouraging the Székelys of any armed action against the Romanian occupation was the most 
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important.44 It was about that time, when the activity of Romanian political activity in most of the 
Banat was also stalled by the Serbian authorities,45 only to restart around June 1919. But in the 
meantime, especially in late May and early June, a series of demonstrations and assemblies were 
organized by cultural and political associations and always with the support of the administration  in 
Transylvania and the Old Kingdom to protest the partition of the region.46 
The protests were similar, few local dignitaries delivering speeches in which certain arguments in 
favor of the Romanian claims were outlined. In this way, they offer a vivid picture of how the Banat 
was constructed for an audience which had only very limited personal experience of the region and 
the Romanians inhabiting the territory. For example, at the assembly held on 24 May 1919 in 
Ploesti,47 a professor of a local secondary school gave a speech, which started with the assertion of 
the indissoluble geographic and economic unity of the Banat. He also gave a detailed historical 
overview, which was not always part of the script used elsewhere. The historical argument asserted 
Romanian continuity since before the Roman conquest and aimed at countering the Serbian 
historical arguments, not these of the Hungarians. The Dacians (i.e. the Geto-Dacian civilization) 
managed to build a state that was as developed as the Roman Empire, and later Traian set out for his 
conquest of Dacia through the Banat, resulting in the early Latinization. The Romanians preserved 
their civilization throughout the Völkerwanderung48 that lasted until 1326, when the Hungarian king 
Károly Róbert conquered the Banat and had not found a single Slav there. The whole Ottoman era 
was omitted and the speaker continued with the arrival of Serbs in 1690, with Arsenije, the Patriarch 
of Ipek in exile. A scene for often violent clashes and oppression of the Romanians within the 
Orthodox church was set up. Although Emperor Joseph II admitted that the Romanians were the 
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original inhabitants there, the oppression nevertheless continued, first, within the Voivodina 
province (1849 – 1860) and later,  in the dualist Hungary. The conclusion was intended to be a 
rhetorical flourish, but it was rather simple and threatening: If the consequences are not drawn from 
the history of the region, there will not be a single Romanian who would allow foreign gendarmes to 
trample upon the soil of Transylvania’s gate, where the great Traian had entered the province.49  
However, using this kind of historical arguments was not the only way to assert the Romanian claims. 
In Soroca, the city in the annexed Bessarabia, another secondary school professor focused on the 
more recent “innumerable sacrifices” of the “small Romanian people” during World War I. The Banat 
question should not be used for political purposes, he continued – obviously referring to the ongoing 
blame game among the politicians50 –, as every Romanian should feel that Romania belongs to all 
Romanians.51  
At the height of the series of rallies was the one held at Șiria on 9 June 9 1919. It was modelled on 
the Alba Iulia Great Assembly, the Romanian villages sending their delegations for an event that 
finally gave expression to the Romanian demands.52 According to press reports, the presence was 
tens of thousands strong (much more than the few thousands that protested in Târgu Mureș on 28 
November 1918). The notabilities present were also from the region   Ștefan Cicio Pop, Victor Beleș, 
Iustin Marsieu. The emphasis on the Banat specificities was, however, very weak. Cicio Pop recalled 
the moment when he was the first candidate at an election in Șiria in 1905 and continued with the 
events related to the war. Somewhat surprisingly, he asserted that the national unity was fostered in 
August 1916, when Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary. Romania deserved payment for its 
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suffering and all territories inhabited by Romanians, therefore the Banat should belong to Romania, 
he concluded. The next speaker, Amos Frâncu, also constructed his argument around national unity, 
without making any distinction between different sub-groups of Romanians or mentioning any Banat 
specificity. However, he also implied a not so veiled threat, when he urged the liberation of every 
Romanian, beyond the Dniester, but also in Ukraine, the Timoc-valley and the Negotin.53 
The tone of the speeches in Lugoj, held on 10 June 1919, was similar. Thus, George Popoviciu who 
spoke to the congregated peasants  (tens of thousands in the local newspaper), after outlining the 
historical continuity of Romanians in the province, went on to invoke the memory of a similar mass 
gathering at the same place on 15 June  1848, when the Romanians demanded the autonomy of the 
province and the Romanianization of its administration.54 It was one of those rare occasions, when 
the texts made more than a passing reference to the Banat as a specific region, the role of 
autonomous status for the province in modern Romanian history being asserted. However, the 
speaker concluded that the Banat should merge with Greater Romania. Finally, the declaration 
adopted at this event complained over the persecution of Romanians under the “Serbian” 
occupation, emphasizing recent martyrhood.55 
Despite the similar aim of national unity, the Székely mobilization consciously used the tropes of the 
established Székely historical mythology, while the Banat was not represented as a specific area of a 
distinct Romanianness, rather as the cradle of the whole nation. The difference was even more 
palpable in how the relationship between the center and the region was perceived. The Székely 
National Council asserted a certain special role and independence from the Mother-the argument 
being complemented, as it was (in Paál’s proposal, with the idea of the WWI national martyrhood. 
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Meanwhile, the Romanian speakers were eager to emphasize a seamless unity of all Romanians, 
without showing any difference within. The different approach is hardly astonishing, as the Székelys 
basically wanted to preserve as much from Hungarian nationhood on their territory as possible, and 
even an independent republic – especially if ialigned with Hungary economically or in foreign policy – 
was considered as being a better perspective than the Romanian rule. The support from the 
Hungarian governments for these plans came56; because from Budapest’s perspective, it was again 
better than Romanian sovereignty as a default outcome. On the contrary, the Banat Romanians 
wanted to avoid offering any new argument for the South Slav state, and it was also easier to foster 
solidarity among Romanians elsewhere without mentioning any differences. But it is also true that 
there was not much in Banat Romanian tradition that was understood as an expression of Banat 
specificity and character,  the Banat being more of a geographic concept, although developed partly 
due to the administrative separation of the region, especially from Transylvania.  
As these efforts to mobilize the masses and demonstrate that the whole nation is lending its active 
support to the cause of the Banat were aligned with diplomacy, it should not surprise anyone that 
the content of another genre of lobbying    memoranda    was hardly different from public speeches. 
As underlined above, the Hungarian government cautiously avoided to qualify the Székely region as a 
specific one, and neither Paál’s devise, nor the separate memorandum of the Székely National 
Council reached the peace conference: In early 1920, when the Hungarian delegation arrived to Paris, 
the council did not exist anymore, and Paál was in Odorheiu, firmly under Romanian control. 
The Romanian intellectuals from the Banat, however, prepared a series of memoranda, which were 
submitted to the Ruling Council, the Bucharest government and several French generals, among 
them Franchet d’Espérey.57  The memos were of a generic nature, the historical argument was hardly 
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original, based on the assumption of Romanian continuity,58 and characterized the Banat Romanians 
as the purest Romanians who preserved their Romanian soul in every moment.59 The longest one 
used tropes like Trajan’s entry into Dacia through the Banat, the early colonization and Latinization, 
the dubious claim that the Banat was an autonomous part of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary and 
later, in the fiteentth century, the local Romanians received autonomy. The text is essentially a long 
and detailed history of the region along well-known lines, which emphasized regarding the modern 
era the Romanian national struggle against any oppression, pointing out that the Romanian 
nationalist candidates at parliamentary elections were always the most successful in Caraș-Severin 
county. But instead of treating it as a regional specificity, the argument was used as a proof of their 
stronger Romanianness. Thus, the region was again subordinated to, almost dissolved within, the 
national unity. 
Afterlife: two national peripheries and one regionIn a curious manner, the distinct features of the 
region became more visible after the mobilization efforts subsided during the peace conference, and 
it happened through the integration of this recent history of the how the area was occupied and the 
border was drawn. Still, the main difference remained in this subsequent period too: the Székelys 
were further imagined by themselves and by Hungarians as a distinct people and the most authentic 
Hungarians, a repository of the best national character traits. By contrast, tthe Banat and its 
Romanians got attached to Romania and the Romanian nation without asserting a peculiarity, like in 
the case of the Székely region. 
I do not mean here, however, that the struggle for the border during the Peace conference in Paris 
would not have affected how these regions were imagined by Romanians or Hungarians within and 
from without. First, the two regions became avatars for specific injustices, which resonated well 
beyond their geographic borders. The violation of the idea of national self-determination was 
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manifested in the case of the Székelys, so that it was easily used by Hungarian propaganda for the 
revision of the peace treaty, signed on 4 July 1920, and it was permanently projected to the 
Hungarians within the country.60 It enhanced the notion of a better Székely Hungarianness and 
created an entitlement for redemption and compensation.61  
The Banat Hungarians were also portrayed as sufferers, but the most important development for 
them was how their region was realigned and moved on the mental map from “Southern Hungary” 
to the “Eastern Romania”. The Hungarian government had a series of clandestine agencies that 
channeled support from Budapest to the lost territories. Initially, the Banat was part of the support 
scheme dedicated to the southern parts, later to be incorporated in the so-called “Keleti Actio”.62 But 
within the new Hungarian minority party it still retained a regional difference, instead of county 
organizations a regional one was erected. 
While it was certainly less apparent in the case of Banat Romanians, their carefully constructed 
martyrdom, during the South Slav occupation and later, placed them in a similar position as that of 
the Székelys’.63 It gave Romania an argument when it came to the injustice the country suffered at 
the Peace conference, and it was also a handy leverage in political struggles within the country. Not 
only politicians of the RNP   the Romanian National Party (in 1919 acting within the Ruling Council, 
and later, as members of Alexandru VaidaVoevod’s Cabinet), but also the National Liberals, all active 
in the diplomatic efforts to change the decision of the Peace conference, debated the responsibility 
for the outcome. As it was Vaida-Voevod who signed the treaty, the RNP leadership that earlier 
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accused the liberals of incompetence, wanted to brush off Vaida’s responsibility for the loss of a part 
of the province.64 The RNP’s electoral manifesto from April 1920, drafted when the party was in 
opposition, asserted, nevertheless, in its 5th point that the party will fight for the recovery of the lost 
parts of the Banat and Maramureș.65 Thus, the “loss” of the part of Banat was used as an argument 
of electoral propaganda against the liberals and People’s Party (PP) candidates. Furthermore, the 
memory of the Serbian occupation was used to discredit those Romanian politicians from the region 
who followed the example of Octavian Goga and Vasile Goldis and joined their ranks around 1920. 
The Banat RNP press attacked such figures vigorously, ridiculed them with reports of alleged 
incidents at their campaign manifestations, in which peasants booed them. It was maliciously 
remarked that these politicians, who before 1918 were followers of Vasile Mangra, whose pro-
Hungarian stance was censured too, bowed down in front of King Petar’s throne.66 
Such symbolic repositioning could not alter the fact that the Banat, one of the most developed 
regions of Hungary before 1918, became a periphery of the new state. It rather highlights that just as 
in the symbolic sphere it needed support from the center, but was reliant on resources from 
Bucharest for completion of the Romanianization of the province, especially in the economic sphere. 
The very multiethnic nature of the province – an important element of its perception from the 
Hungarian side – made it impossible to “detach” the region from the Romanian national unity,67 even 
if complaints over the conduct of the new state were growing, leading to assertions that the Old 
Kingdom’s rule brought chaos and decline.68  
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There were attempts to assert the superiority of the Banat Romanians,69 often only with implicit 
suggestions  that their presence and their leading role in Greater Romania will strengthen the 
morality and Romanianness of the new country    an argument frequently used in the Hungarian-
Székely relation too. But suc attempts was rarely done without pointing out Romanina national 
credentials, and even the anti-Bucharest Banat regionalism was dissolved within the joint anti-Old 
Kingdom political stance and movement led by Transylvanians.70 In this construct, the Banat was 
symbolically different, but in practice had the same grievances and demands as every other new 
province. The Banat Romaniansavoided thus strengthening a specific regional consciousness, rather 
furthered common Romanian national goals.71 
Finally, and probably, the most conspicuous element of these developments, which drew the most 
distinct boundaries within the national groups, was the way external actors used these regionalist 
notions for dividing their alleged national opponents. While the idea of a Székely republic was given 
up very early by the leading politicians and replaced with the program of Hungarian national 
autonomy in order to preserve the unity of the Hungarian minority, the Romanian politicians tried, 
on the contrary, to capitalize on the sense of Székely difference. As early as January 1919, an 
emissary of the Ruling Council approached Paál, who was under arrest, and made an offer: If Paál 
would organize a Székely manifestation with the aim of declaring the Székely’s willingness to join 
Romania, the region would receive broad autonomy.72 The offer was declined, but the idea was 
revived later, when a number of Hungarian figures, like Béla Maurer, Géza Kiss or Árpád Fáy, were 
running in Székelyföld as pro-Romanian Hungarian candidates for the parliament. Later, in the 
Chamber of Deputies, they willingly declared, as representatives of the Székelys, that their “nation’s” 
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was willing to freely unite with Romania.73 It is thus not surprising that even the State Security 
followed news of any Székely republican movement    not just to suppress it, but to manipulate, to 
separate the Székelys from the Hungarians.74 In the thirties, a serologic research that was supposed 
to prove that Székelys were Magyarized Romanians was carried out.75 
The Hungarians in Romania had to be more careful in order to avoid censorship, but they had ample 
material to make a structurally similar assertion regarding the Banat. As the accusations targeting the 
People’ Party politicians show, in the Banat there was in fact   a large group of Romanian intellectuals 
who were aligned with a pro-Hungarian politics. Some of them left politics around 1920, others 
joined different Romanian parties, such as the People’ Party and the National-Liberal Party, even the 
RNP stalwarts had a past in Hungary that was sometimes less characteristically anti-Hungarian as 
they wished to project. Therefore, any retrospective intervention recalling the dualist era was 
capable to challenge the nationalist credentials of interwar Banat regionalists, at least implicitly. 
Elemér Jakabffy, a Hungarian politician from Lugoj, who was active before and after 1918, provided 
ample material in his journal, Magyar Kisebbség.76 It was not a direct attack on anyone, but it 
certainly questioned assertions, like the unshakable nationalism of the Banat Romanians, and 
revealed a much more subtle local world, the one that was obscured by the dominance of Romanian 
nationalism within the Banat regionalism.  
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